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Abstract
We modify the story behind the Shapley-Shubik power index and
apply it to a legislative body. The resulting proportional index may
be trivial, but is free from the paradoxical behaviour observable with
standard power indices. The widespread use of this index may in fact
be the reason for these \paradoxes".
Keywords and phrases: a priori voting power, paradox of large size,
paradox of new members, paradox of quarrelling members, Gamson's
Law.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
The reform of the EU legislative mechanisms have put weighted voting and
voting power in particular in the spotlight. Since Shapley and Shubik (1954)
applied the Shapley-value to simple games numerous indices have been in-
troduced and the search for the best index is far from over: all the known
indices exhibit some or more of the so-called paradoxes (Brams, 1975/2003):
true statements that are absurd (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998).
While these paradoxes are often dismissed as mere features, the selection
from the plethora of power indices remains dicult. Axiomatisation seemed
to be the right way to organise indices, but axioms are not less ad hoc
than the indices themselves (Laruelle and Valenciano, 2005, pp37-38). Also
rejecting the (complete) axiomatisation approach, Felsenthal and Machover
(1995) suggest a set of desirable properties, but so far no index satises their
postulates.
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1We approach the problem from both ends. On the one hand we present a
motivation for the proportional, a new, trivial power index, On the other we
argue that the paradoxes may be a result of this naive intuition about power.
As scientic models enter popular thinking we should also regard `paradoxes'
outdated or no more than `apparently strange pieces of behaviour' (Felsenthal
and Machover, 1998, p. 221)
The structure of the paper is as follows. After the introduction of basic
concepts and notation we dene the proportional index. Then we elaborate
on the paradoxes and show that this trivial index is immune to the paradoxes.
We close with a discussion of this result's implications.
2 The `trivial' index is free from paradoxes
A weighted voting game G = (N;(wi)i2N;q) consists of a collection N of n
voters having w1;w2;:::;wn votes such that w =
Pn
i=1 wi, and a quota q,
w  q > w=2, or the number of votes required to pass a bill. For more on
weighted voting games see Stran (1994). A power index is a function k
that assigns to each weighted voting game a non-negative vector in RN
+.
The proportional index  is the trivial power index given by i =
wi
w .
This measure is popularly known in political science as Gamson's Law:
`Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of
the payo proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute'
(Gamson, 1961).
Simplicity is not without merit: Brams (1975/2003) lists three natural
properties that any power index should satisfy (the list is extended by Felsen-
thal and Machover (1998)), but the best-know indices satisfy none of these.
These disappointing negative results (known as paradoxes) do not extend to
the proportional index. In the following we state these properties and show
that they hold for the proportional index.
Property of (large) size Let G = (N;(wi)i2N;q) be a voting game and
k a power index. Dene G
0 by the merger of players i and j. The
resulting party ij has a weight wij = wi + wj. The property requires
ki(G) + kj(G)  kij(G
0).
Proposition 1. The index  satises the Property of (large) size.
Proof. Using the notation in the denition, the merged member's weight is






w = i(G) + j(G).Property of new members Now dene G
00 as an extension of G by parties
n + 1;:::;m and weighs wn+1;:::;wm and a q00 to meet the require-
ments. The property requires ki(G)  ki(G
00), that is, the introduction
of new members should not increase a party's power.
Proposition 2. The index  satises the Property of new members.
Proof. An `old' member's weight remains w0
i = wi, while the total increases to










Before we turn to Brams's last paradox we mention three listed by Felsen-
thal and Machover (1998) that hold for the proportional index by denition.
Property of redistribution Let G = (N;(wi)i2N;q) and G
0 = (N;(w0
i)i2N;q)
be two weighted voting games. The property requires that for all i 2 N
we have ki(G) < ki(G
0) if and only if wi < w0
i.
Donation Property is then the special case where w0
i = wi +  and w0
j =
wj    for some i;j 2 N and w0
k = wk for all k = 2 fi;jg.
Dominance Property A power index satises dominance in a weighted
voting game G if wi < wj implies ki(G) < kj(G).
Property of quarrelling members If two parties refuse to vote together,
this should not increase their total power.
The property of quarrelling members has been criticised for looking at actions
(quarrelling) beyond the specication of the game. Indeed, a quarrelling
coalition is losing even if it meets the quota. Before we move on to the proof
of this last property we present the proportional index as a modication of
the Shapley-Shubik index; this approach will then be used in the proof.
Power indices have been used in legislative voting, (van Deemen and Rusi-
nowska, 2003) where voting weights are given by the number of representa-
tives in each group.1 In the following we consider such a voting situation.
In the model of Shapley and Shubik (1954) voters arrive in a random
order, until a pivotal player turns a losing coalition into a winning one. The
Shapley-Shubik index is then the proportion of orders where the player is
pivotal, formally: i =
# times i is pivotal
n!
A weighted voting game consists of a number of players, having dierent
weights { the EU Council of Ministers is the classical example where countries
of dierent sizes are represented by single, weighted votes. Such examples
1Results extend to irrational wi using limits.are relatively rare; in most national parliaments the weight of the dierent
parties comes from having dierent numbers of representatives, and the power
is the collection of these individual voters' power. In such a model a party
is pivotal, if one of its representatives is pivotal. Formally,
^ i =
# times a representative of i is pivotal
w!
: (1)
Now recall that a coalition is winning if it has size q or greater. Therefore
a player is pivotal and gets credit if he or she is the qth to vote for. A party's
power index is the probability that the qth voter is one of its representatives.
However, this probability is the same as the probability that the rst or any
kth voter is its representative:
wi
w , the proportional index. This yields the
following result:
Proposition 3. For a voting game (N;(wi)i2N;q) we have ^ i =
wi
w = i,
that is, the party's share of the votes.
Proposition 4. The index  satises the Property of quarrelling members.
Proof. When two players quarrel, coalitions containing both are losing even
if they meet the quota in size.
In the following we calculate the powers of players i and j in case they
quarrel. Observe that a winning coalition has always size q. Now suppose
that all we know is that player i has a representatives in the coalition. Then
the conditional probability that i gets credit is simply a
q. We can therefore

















Similarly we can condition on the number b of representatives of j in q and
calculate powers. The probability that i or j win having, respectively, a and








wi   a;wj   b

wi!wj!(w   wi   wj)!
In case i and j quarrel either a or b must be 0 (hence ab = 0). After some



























=i(G) + j(G) (5)Equivalent transformations lead to













This inequality holds term-by-term.
3 Discussion
It is remarkable that such a trivial and {admittedly{ imperfect index satises
all of Brams's properties. On the other hand, Diermeier and Merlo (2004),
Gelman, Katz, and Bafumi (2004) Fr echette, Kagel, and Morelli (2005) (and
references therein), nd that the proportional distribution of power behaves
surprisingly well both in empirical tests and coalition formation models, sug-
gesting that assigning power proportionally is a common practice if not the
standard.
The properties of this natural index are then natural, too, making any-
thing dierent, such as power indices that take a more educated look at
voting unnatural, even paradoxical. In this light it is not so surprising to see
Luxemburg to be a null voter in the 1958 EU Council of Ministers and many
would have argued it had too many votes for its size. The question that re-
mains is whether science should formalise our intuition (stick to paradoxes)
or try to change our intuition and make us accept these paradoxes as normal
(that is: stick to power indices). The recent discussions about and general
interest in weighted voting and power indices in connection to the EU reform
suggest that we are ready for plan B.
References
Brams, S. J. (1975/2003): Game theory and politics. Dover, Mineola, N.Y.,
2nd edn.
Diermeier, D., and A. Merlo (2004): \An Empirical Investigation of
coalitional bargaining procedures," Journal of Public Economics, 88(3-4),
783{797.
Felsenthal, D. S., and M. Machover (1995): \Postulates and para-
doxes of relative voting power - A critical re-appraisal," Theory and Deci-
sion, 38(2), 195{229.(1998): The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice,
Problems and Paradoxes. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Fr echette, G. R., J. H. Kagel, and M. Morelli (2005): \Gamson's
Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory," Games and Economic Be-
havior, 51(2), 365{390.
Gamson, W. A. (1961): \A theory of coalition formation," American So-
ciological Review, 26(3), 373{382.
Gelman, A., J. N. Katz, and J. Bafumi (2004): \Standard Voting
Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis," British Journal of
Political Science, 34, 657{674.
Laruelle, A., and F. Valenciano (2005): \A critical reappraisal of some
voting paradoxes," Public Choice, 125(1), 14{41.
Shapley, L. S., and M. Shubik (1954): \A method for evaluating the
distribution of power in a committee system," American Political Science
Review, 48(3), 787{792.
Straffin, Jr., P. D. (1994): \Power and Stability in Politics," in Handbook
of Game Theory with Economic Applications, ed. by R. J. Aumann, and
S. Hart, vol. II, chap. 32, pp. 1127{1151. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
van Deemen, A., and A. Rusinowska (2003): \Paradoxes of Voting
Power in Dutch Politics," Public Choice, 115(1-2), 109{137.